Numerous studies have found that US commercial banks are quite inefficient, and we find that, on average, banks became more technically inefficient between 1984 and 1993. Our analysis of productivity change, however, shows that technological improvements adopted by a few banks pushed out the efficient frontier, and that, on average, commercial banks experienced productivity gains. For banks with assets less than $300 million, however, technological improvement was insufficient to offset increased inefficiency, and thus productivity declined over the period. Our findings suggest that increasing inefficiency is reflective of an industry undergoing rapid technical change and adjustment of average firm size, but not necessarily a long-term decline.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. banking industry has had a tumultuous decade. Although large numbers of bank failures during 1985-91 have since given way to record profits, researchers continue to debate whether the industry faces long-term decline (e.g., Wheelock, 1993; Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995) . From a post-World War II high of 15,126 banks in 1984, failures and acquisitions reduced the number of U.S. commercial banks to 10,323 by the end of 1995. Much of this decline can be attributed to the disappearance of very small banks, i.e., those with assets of less than $100 million. Historically, small banks have been more profitable than large banks. As recently as 1982, average profit rates (return on average assets) were inversely related to bank size. 1 By 1995, however, this pattern had completely reversed, with a positive association between size and profit rates for banks of under $15 billion of assets.
In their comprehensive review of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. banking industry, Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) describe the technological and regulatory changes driving consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. Among these are rapid advances in computer and communications technology. These have led to the development of new bank services (from ATM machines to internet banking) and financial instruments (e.g., various sorts of derivative securities), as well as increased competition for banks from non-bank financial firms and markets. Perhaps even more important have been changes in regulation, including the deregulation of deposit interest rates, revisions to capital requirements, and elimination of many state and, beginning in 1997, federal restrictions on branch banking.
The many technological and regulatory changes affecting banking in recent years have substantially altered the environment in which banks operate. Such changes may have 'Specifically, in 1982 , average profit rates were lower for each successively larger asset-size category.
The categories are less than $100 million, $100-$300 million, $300~$1,000million, $1,000-$15,000 million, and greater than $15,000 million.
significantly altered the technology of bank production, with possible consequences for the long-run viability of the industry. Numerous studies, based largely on data from the 1980s and early 1990s, have found that commercial banks tend to suffer from substantial managerial inefficiency. That is, the average bank operates considerably less efficiently than the existing technology allows, as estimated by the operations of the most efficient banks (see Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993 , for a survey of this literature). By itself, efficiency can be a misleading measure of the well-being of either a bank or an industry, however, particularly for one undergoing a major environmental transformation. Rapid technical progress, for example, which makes feasible the production of given levels of outputs with fewer inputs (or, equivalently, the production of more outputs with given levels of inputs) than in the past, could result in lower average bank efficiency, even if banks became increasingly productive over time. 2
Whereas most studies of efficiency in banking have failed to consider the effects of technical change, studies of technical change in banking have typically failed to isolate shifts in the efficient frontier from changes in average inefficiency. An important exception is Bauer, Berger and Humphrey (1993) , who separate changes in average inefficiency from changes in scale economies for banks operating on the efficient frontier to come up with a measure of total factor productivity. For a panel of banks with assets of more than $100 million during 1977-88, Bauer et al. find little change in average inefficiency, but a noticeable decline in productivity over the period, which they attribute to deregulation and increases in competition, both among banks and from non-bank sources. Bauer et al. (1993) , however, do not examine differences in productivity among banks of 2 Suppose, for example, that technical progress caused the efficient frontier to shift by 10 percent from one year to the next, i.e., that on the new efficient frontier banks use 10 percent fewer inputs to produce a given level of outputs than on the old frontier. The average bank might have a productivity gain of, say, 6 percent, i.e., be able to produce a given level of inputs with 6 percent fewer inputs than in the first year, but still experience increased inefficiency (measured as the distance to the efficient frontier) of 4 percent. different sizes, and their sample excludes the very small banks whose numbers have declined the most in recent years and which may well have felt the largest effects of deregulation and technical change. As Berger et al. (1995) emphasize, the technological and regulatory changes occurring since 1980 probably had very different effects on different sized banks, which may explain the substantial shifts over time in the size distribution of banks. The elimination of branching laws, for example, increased competition, especially for small banks in small banking markets. Increased competition could force banks to operate more efficiently in order to survive. Consequently, we might expect to see efficiency gains among surviving banks, especially small surviving banks. Other changes, such as improvements in computer or communications technology, could have altered the technology of bank production in ways favoring either small or large banks. 3
Among the few studies attempting to measure technical change among banks of different sizes, Humphrey (1993) finds that banks as a whole experienced positive technical change during the pre-deregulation period of 1977-80, substantial technical regress during 1980-82, and essentially no change during 1983-88. Small banks (those with assets between $100 and $200 million) suffered considerable technical regress relative to large banks, however, which he attributes to the relatively high dependence of small banks on the types of deposits that were deregulated in 1980, and subsequent sharp increases in their interest rates. Hunter and Timme (1991) also observe that larger banks enjoyed greater technological gains during 1980-86 than small banks, as do Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) , who conclude that large banks enjoyed a "high pace" of technological advancement between 1980 and 1985. This paper advances the work in this area by extending the sample period through 1993, as well as by measuring average efficiency and technological changes for the universe of 3 These changes will not, however, necessarily result in observable gains in efficiency or productivity if, for example, they improve the quality of bank output (e.g., by increasing the number of ATM machines or providing bank customers with increased account options). U.S. commercial banks, rather than for small samples. More importantly, like Bauer et al. (1993) , we employ a methodology that permits isolation of technological changes from changes in average inefficiency. But, in contrast to Bauer et al. , who estimate translog cost equations, we use non-parametric methods to construct indices of productivity change, and then decompose changes in total factor productivity into changes in technology and changes in technical efficiency. This enables us to gauge the extent to which technical progress (or regress) and the catching-up (or falling behind) of the average bank relative to the efficient frontier account for changes in productivity, as well as to provide a comparison for estimates of total factor productivity based on econometric techniques.
We find that, on average, commercial banks experienced improved productivity between 1984 and 1993, but the failure of many banks to adapt quickly to technical change explains why average inefficiency remained high throughout the period. We find considerable variation between years, however. For example, banks generally became less productive during 1989-92, and only those with at least $1 billion of assets became more productive during 1992-93.
We also find pronounced differences in productivity gains among banks of different sizes throughout the period. In general, we observe that banks with at least $300 million of assets (in 1985 dollars) became more productive on average, while those with less than $300 million of assets became less productive. Our findings thus support the conclusions of Berger et al. (1995) , who argue that deregulation and technical change likely had differential effects on banks of different sizes. They also stand in contrast with Bauer et at. (1993) who find a decline in average productivity for banks in their sample, but support those studies of technical progress which find relative gains for larger sized banks.
The next section describes our methodology for measuring changes in productivity and -4-the decomposition into changes in efficiency and technology. The data are described in Section 3, and Section 4 presents our results. Conclusions are discussed in the final section.
METHODOLOGY
Our analysis of commercial bank production uses nonparametric techniques based on the Shepard (1970) output distance function, which measures the technical inefficiency of a firm relative to a convex combination of the best-practice firms. The output distance function gives a measure of how much a bank's outputs can be proportionately increased given the observed levels of its inputs. 4 Linear programming techniques are used to estimate the distance functions, and resemble other linear programming-based measures of technical efficiency known as data envelopment analysis (DEA). We construct Malmquist indices from the distance function estimates to measure changes in commercial bank productivity over time, and decompose these changes into changes in technology and changes in efficiency. 5
Because the impacts of technological advances and regulatory changes might vary across banks of different sizes, we allow for variable returns to scale in measuring productivity changes for banks in various size groups. This permits modeling of the entire range of the technology. Although some researchers might argue that the operations of "small" 4 Alternatively, input distance functions n~asure the feasible proportionate contraction of inputs conditional on observed outputs. In both cases, efficiency is measured in terms of normalized Euclidian distances to the best-practice frontier, and the notion of efficiency is pure technical efficiency. Estimation of distance functions in either direction requires assumptions (which are the same for both directions) only on the underlying technology, and not on the behavior of bank managers. Thus the choice of orientation is largely arbitrary.
5 Berg et at. (1992) use this methodology to study productivity changes in Norwegian banks. Other applications include Fare et at. (1994) , who use linear programming (LP) methods to construct Malmquist indices to assess productivity changes across countries; their methods are closely related to the LP methods used by Chavas and Cox (1990) . See Lovell (1993) for an extensive list of other DEA applications. The Malmquist index allows for inefficient operation and does not imply an underlying functional form for technology, and is thus more general than alternative indices such as the Törnqvist index advocated by Caves et at. (1982) . Caves et at. (1982) prove that the Malmquist and Törnqvist indices are equivalent when the underlying technology is translog, second-order terms are constant over time, and firms are cost-minimizers and revenue-maximizers.
and "large" banks differ fundamentally, banks of all sizes presumably strive for technical efficiency. Systematic differences in the operations of different sized banks should be captured by the variable-returns technology we employ. Moreover, our technique ensures that each bank is compared to the best-practice frontier defined by banks of similar size. This approach also ensures a large sample, thereby avoiding biases associated with applying DEA to small samples, and of comparing results from different sample sizes (as would be necessary if large and small banks are examined separately)~6
To begin, consider N banks which employ n inputs to produce m outputs over T time periods. For the ith bank, i = 1,... , N, let x~C R~and y~C R~denote input and output vectors, respectively, used at time t, t = 1 T. Then the technology faced by banks at time t is the set~J
I 1ĩ s the usual production set, and is assumed closed, convex for all (xt, yt). In addition,
we assume that all production requires use of some inputs, i.e., (xt,yt) ~~JIt if yt > 0, x~= 0; and both inputs and outputs are strongly disposable,
The Sh"phard (1970) output distance function corresponding to bank i is defined as
and measures the output technical efficiency of bank i at time t relative to the technology existing at time t. Clearly, D~It< 1, with D 1 t = 1 indicating that the ith bank is on the boundary of the production set and hence is technically efficient. Korostelev et at. (1995) for a discussion of this problem.
We can also measure the efficiency of bank i at time t 1 relative to the technology at time t 2 by defining the distance function
Similarly, we can also measure the efficiency of bank i at time t 2 relative to the technology at time t, by defining
Then, Malmquist-type indices to measure productivity change from time t 1 to time t 2 (relative to the technology at time t,) may be defined as
and (relative to the technology at time t 2 ) as
The indices in (5)-(6) are called Malmquist-type indices after Malmquist (1953) , who suggested comparing the input of a firm at two different points in time in terms of the minimum input required to produce the output of one period under the technology of the other period. Caves et at. (1982) extended this idea to define Malmquist productivity indices similar to those in (5)-(6), though they define the indices so that two firms could be compared at a point in time t, whereas here we compare one firm over two periods. In addition,
Caves et at. assume Dthitl = Dt21t2 = 1; i.e., they assume no technical inefficiency, which we allow for in our study.
Fare et at. (1991, 1992) combine the indices in (5)-(6) into a single Malmquist-type index by computing the geometric mean
-7-Fare et at. then decompose the index of productivity change into changes in efficiency and technology by rewriting (7) as
The ratio Dt21t2/DthIti in (8) The measurement of technical change is illustrated in Figure 1 where two output quantities Yi, Y2 are produced from a single input. Suppose the production frontier shifts outward as shown between time t 1 and t 2 point A gives a firm's location 7 The second ratio inside the parentheses in (8) is analgous to the measure of technical change used by Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) . From the definitions in (8)- (10), we can write z~Prodt1,t2 = L~Efft1,t2 x~.Techt1,t2
Changes in productivity, as measured by the Malmquist-type index in (8), are thus composed of both changes in efficiency and changes in technology, with z~Prodt1~t2 less than (greater than) unity representing a loss (gain) of productivity. The advantage of
Malmquist-type indices is that productivity changes can be decomposed into these separate components.
In order to estimate the indices i~Prodt1~t2,Efft1,t2 and~Tech t 1~t2, we must first estimate the technology implied by (1), Following Fare et at. (1985) and others, we estimate the production set by the convex hull of the observations, so that
where K gives the number of firms, yt = (8)- (10) with their corresponding estimates. Conceivably, for some observations the LP problems from which the distance functions D~hIt2 and D~2It1 are to be estimated will involve infeasible sets of constraints. In such cases the distance function cannot be computed for these observations since no solution to the LP problem exists.
Consequently, L~Techt1~t2 and i~Prodt1~t2may be undefined for some observations.
THE DATA
In order to measure productivity change, we must first specify a model of bank production. The literature treats banks as going concerns that combine labor, capital, and various financial inputs to produce financial outputs. One approach, termed the production approach, measures output by the number of deposit and loan accounts serviced by the bank. The more common intermediation approach views banks as financial intermediaries, with outputs measured in dollar amounts and with labor, capital, and various funding sources treated as inputs. 8 8 For further discussion of the two approaches, see Berger et at. (1987) . Mester (1987) observes that
The intermediation approach has several variants. Humphrey (1991, 1992) classify activities for which banks create high value-added, such as loans, demand deposits, and time and savings deposits as "important" outputs, with labor, capital, and purchased funds classified as inputs. Alternatively, Aly et at. (1990) , Hancock (1991) and Fixier and Zieschang (1992) adopt a "user-cost" framework where a bank asset is classified as an output if the financial return on the asset exceeds the opportunity cost of the investment, and a liability is classified as an output if the financial cost of the liability is less than its opportunity cost. 9 While their details differ, empirically the value-added and usercost approaches tend to suggest similar classifications of bank inputs and outputs, with the principal exception being the classification of demand deposits as an output in most user-cost studies and as both an input and an output when the value-added approach is taken. We adopt the intermediation approach, and because our measurement of technical efficiency depends on a mutually exclusive distinction between inputs and outputs, we follow Aly et at. (1990) and other studies that classify inputs and outputs on the basis of user-cost.
We define three inputs: labor (X 1 ), physical capital (X 2 ), and purchased funds (X 3 ).
Labor is measured by the number of full-time equivalent employees on the payroll at the end of each period. Capital is measured by the book value of premises and fixed assets (including capitalized leases). Purchased funds include time and savings deposits, net federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase, and other borrowed money. We define five outputs: real estate loans (Y 1 ), commercial and industrial
loans (Y 2 ), consumer loans (Y 3 ), all other loans (Y 4 ), and total demand deposits (Y 5 ).
Specification of these inputs and outputs is consistent with earlier studies by Aly et at. and the choice between the production and intermediation approaches often depends upon available data; the majority of studies on banking efficiency have adopted the intermediation approach. 9 See Hancock (1991, pp. 27-33) or Berger and Humphrey (1992, pp. 248-250) .
others.
All data were obtained from the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports)
for the first quarter of each year 1984-1993. We omitted banks with missing values for any of the inputs or outputs. In addition, we omitted banks making no loans, or that had total loans in excess of purchased funds plus demand deposits.'°Our resulting sample has from 11,387 observations in 1993 to a high of 14,108 observations in 1985. The Call Report data include a unique identifier that allows us to track individual banks over the 10 years represented in our data.
The distance function in (2) is independent of units of measurement in the inputs and outputs. However, since we use (2)- (4) 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
' 0 The Call Reports include data on specialty institutions such as credit card subsidiaries of holding companies, which do not conform to the traditional view of banks. While some such institutions may remain in our sample, our deletion criteria should minimize their impact on efficiency scores measured for other banks. In addition, because we focus on averages of efficiency scores and productivity indices, the presence of nontraditional banks in our sample should have minimal impact on the results. Other studies have avoided this issue by using small, selective samples.
In order to estimate technical efficiency, the LP problem in (12) Arithmetic mean values of the computed distance function values are shown in Table 2 by year and by bank size.
The average values of the distance functions reported in Table 2 indicate that in each year the largest banks are, on average, more technically efficient than banks in the smaller size categories. This finding is consistent with results from estimation of a parametric profit function by Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993) , who also find that large banks are substantially more efficient than small banks. Comparing efficiency across years is problematic, however, because changes in average distance function values from one year to the next could be due either to movement of banks within the input/output space, or to technological change, i.e., to movement of the boundary of the production set over time.
The example shown in Figure 1 makes this apparent. If the firm had remained at point A and the technology shifted as shown (from t 1 to t 2 ), the output distance function values Dt1 It 2 and Dt2 Iti would indicate a decrease in efficiency. In terms of converting inputs into outputs, however, by remaining at point A, the firm is no more or less productive at time the largest banks to as much as 32 percent on average for the small banks. Table 4 . This would result if banks typically moved very little in the input-output space during 1986-87, but the production frontier shifted outward. Apparently, a small proportion of banks in each category pushed the technology outward, but most banks failed to keep up with the technical progress.
As before, changes in technology over the entire period of the study are shown in the last line of Table 4 . The changes in technology over the entire study period are significant, with technology advancing from about 27 percent on average for the smallest banks to about 42 percent on average for the largest banks. Our results are thus consistent with previous studies finding significant technical progress in banking during the 1980s, especially for larger-sized banks.
Finally, average productivity changes are given in Table 5 . Decreasing efficiency and increasing technology tend to offset each other in determining changes in productivity.
Nonetheless, productivity generally increased over the first five periods of the study, and decreased over the last four periods. On average, banks in the two largest size categories experienced significant increases in productivity over the entire period 1984-93, while banks in the two smallest size categories show a significant decline in productivity from 1984 to 1993, as indicated by the last line of ASSETS < $300 million, productivity declined on average, suggesting that not only did the average bank in this group fail to keep up with the changing technology, but it also experienced a decrease in its efficiency.
The pattern ofproductivity change we find seems consistent with what one might expect of an industry undergoing rapid change. In response to new tools or market opportunities, a few pioneering firms might adapt quickly, while others respond cautiously and fall behind.
Competitive or regulatory changes might also have different effects on different-sized firms.
Relaxation ofbarriers to branching or increased reporting requirements would seem to favor larger banks, and the relatively large productivity gains of larger-sized banks since 1984
suggest that on average they have adapted better to the changed environment than small banks. Our results indicate, however, that many banks of all sizes have lagged behind the leaders, leaving room for significant productivity gains in the future. Ongoing technological improvement is a hopeful signal, though, of continued long-term viability of the banking industry.
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